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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the central distinctions in the literature with regard to the 
behavioral function of the law is between ―intrinsic‖ and ―extrinsic‖ 
motivations.
1
 Extrinsic motivation is linked to actions that are driven 
by external commands or incentives. Conversely, intrinsic motivation 
is found when the behavior is chosen from within the individual, 
usually out of a sense of moral or civic duty.
2
 This Article will 
attempt to improve our understanding of the interrelationship 
between love and money in a legal context, through a discussion of a 
series of theoretical dilemmas related to the interplay between 
intrinsic and extrinsic compliance motivations. For the most part, 
researchers who have worked within the behavioral analysis of legal 
scholarship have not focused on love, but rather on other intrinsic 
motivations, such as trust, morality, and pro-social motivations. 
Love, however, as one of the most basic intrinsic motivations, can 
benefit from the insights explored in the more general context of such 
other intrinsic motivations. Similarly, expanding the discussion from 
money to monetary instruments such as fines, deposits, and rewards, 
as well as other non-monetary legal instruments such as imposing a 
duty, could improve both the theoretical basis of the discussion and 
the empirical data available. 
 
 1. See generally Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal 
Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 227 
(2000) (establishing general distinctions between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation). 
 2. Originally, most discussions of intrinsic motivation were done within the context of 
interest in the task. See generally Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic 
Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627 (1999) (describing the research approach and results 
from a number of studies on intrinsic motivation); Tim Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, Further 
Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals, 22 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 280 (1996) (examining the differences in well-being of 
the individual associated with focusing on extrinsic and intrinsic goals).  
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The Article will be divided into two main parts. The first part will 
focus on three bodies of literature which provide the basic theoretical 
view of how intrinsic and extrinsic compliance motivations interact.
3
 
The second part of the Article will focus on the normative 
implications of this theoretical point of view, leading to some 
tentative policy suggestions as to how to countervail some of the 
disruptive effects of monetary considerations, while still maintaining 
people‘s intrinsic commitment toward socially desirable behavior.  
While the distinction between these two types of motivation 
seems to have been taken for granted in numerous studies, there are a 
few basic questions that remain unsettled, some of which will be 
discussed in this Article. The first is a definitional question which 
attempts to understand which motivations fall within intrinsic 
motivations and which fall under the category of extrinsic 
motivations. While the concept of intrinsic motivation originally 
focused on some inherent interest in a task,
4
 it has long since been 
expanded, especially in economics and legal scholarship, to include 
numerous other intrinsic motivations such as morality, duty, 
legitimacy, fairness, loyalty, identity, and potentially love as well. 
Similarly, external motivations were expanded to include not only 
monetary rewards, but also various legal, verbal, social, and 
organizational mechanisms which attempt to cause people to engage 
in socially desirable behaviors. Accounting for the variety of 
motivations which are treated as either extrinsic or intrinsic should be 
part of any attempt to generalize from an empirical study to a broader 
theoretical argument. Understanding the nature of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation leads us to our next question regarding the 
mutual influence of internal and external motivations.  
There is an ongoing heated debate in the behavioral literature as to 
how these two types of motivations interact.
5
 One of the main 
purposes of this review is to demonstrate the difficulty one faces 
when attempting to understand the complex nature of the relationship 
 
 3. Due to both space constraints and a need to maintain the focus of the Article, literature 
that focuses more on the sociological aspects than on behavioral perspectives, such as 
commodification and destruction of social capital, will not be examined in this Article. 
 4  See Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 635.  
 5. See, e.g., Deci & Ryan, supra note 1, at 235–37. 
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between these two types of motivations. While some view extrinsic 
rewards as undermining intrinsic motivation, others find that the two 
mechanisms can be mutually reinforcing.
6
 
The first part of this Article will present these two conflicting 
views in the literature, with an obvious emphasis on legal contexts. 
We will start with the expressive literature, which seems to be the 
leading one in its ability to account for multiple compliance 
motivations, and then move to the ―crowding-out‖ literature, which is 
the dominant literature in accounting for the conditions under which 
extrinsic motivations undermine intrinsic ones.  
The expressive law literature focuses on social norms‘ mediated 
effect of law on behavior. This body of literature attempts, in part, to 
examine how the traditional function of the law, namely deterrence, 
can coexist with its expressive attempts to inform and educate the 
public as to what is socially and morally desirable.
7
 Naturally, the 
type of quandaries addressed within this literature could shed light on 
the possibility of an extrinsic motive (e.g., deterrence) to improve 
rather than disrupt the functioning of a more ―intrinsically-related‖ 
compliance motivation (e.g., morality). 
The second strand of literature which we will review is the 
―crowding-out‖ literature. This literature originated in psychology, 
flourished in economics, and was recently imported into the legal 
scholarship. Most of the research conducted in this context focuses 
on how external incentives, particularly money, may undermine 
people's reliance on their internal motives.
8
 While this type of 
 
 6. The debate about the type of effect of extrinsic motivations on intrinsic ones and its 
various dimensions and aspects should be seen as one between the expressive law literature and 
the crowding-out literature. Even Edward Deci, the ―father‖ of the crowding-out theory, 
recognizes that in many cases, external rewards may enhance intrinsic motivations, and that 
there is an importance attached to aspects such as interpersonal contexts and verbal cues as to 
how to interpret an extrinsic reward. See Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 628 
(discussing the conflicting effects of extrinsic motivations). Even within the scholarship of 
expressive law, and especially within the norms and legal scholarships, there is recognition of 
how sanctions and penalties may send erroneous signals as to the value of engaging in a given 
behavior. For a recent demonstration, see Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using 
Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 695–99 (2009). 
 7. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness 
of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 
1183 (2010).  
 8. See, e.g., Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 627. 
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research may suggest that any form of monetary incentive may 
undermine the ability of love to motivate behavior, a closer look at 
the factors that moderate the effect of monetary incentives on 
intrinsic motivations may suggest a more multifaceted and nuanced 
effect than one might assume.  
Finally, we will review the literature on biases related to both the 
perception of what others are doing and their motivations. Through 
this review, the Article will demonstrate that, for the most part, there 
is a consistent gap between the likelihood of attributing intrinsic 
motivation to one‘s own behavior and that of others. In contrast to the 
previous two sections, which directly address the influence of 
extrinsic controls over intrinsic motivation, this third section dealing 
with relevancy is more indirect. Nevertheless, the existence of such a 
gap creates a whole range of possibilities as to how mutual biases of 
parties in relationships affect the dominant motivation in a given 
relationship.  
The second part of the Article will use the theoretical structures 
developed in the first part to explore a few related empirical studies 
that I had a part in conducting. Based on these empirical studies, I 
will suggest some tentative behaviorally-informed policy dilemmas.  
First, in which contexts would enacting a law be viewed as having 
a similar effect to that of imposing monetary incentives? Or, to frame 
the question differently, does law always carry a similar effect to 
money with regard to non-instrumental activities?  
Second, moving from the effect of law to the effect of money, are 
there creative ways to portray the motivations associated with the 
presentation of money in order to help disassociate some of its 
disruptive effects? What is the potential contribution of framing 
effects in this matter? Is the effect expected to be similar in all 
people? How do people view the effect of extrinsic motivation on the 
intrinsic motivation of others?  
Finally, the Article will demonstrate how the existence of legal 
uncertainty could reduce part of the ―crowding-out‖ effect associated 
with extrinsic motivation by creating some ex ante veil on the legal 
consequences of people's behavior.  
The Article will conclude with some of the main factors that the 
policymaker should take into account, using extrinsic measures, when 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:11 
 
 
examining how best to address an individual‘s intrinsic motivation in 
different social and legal settings.  
II. EXPRESSIVE LAW AND MULTIPLE COMPLIANCE MOTIVATION 
The expressive law literature is the primary literature that deals 
extensively with the existence of competing models of what 
motivates legal compliance. This body of literature attempts, in part, 
to examine how the traditional function of the law, namely 
deterrence, can coexist with its expressive attempts to inform and 
educate the public as to what is socially and morally desirable. 
Naturally, the type of dilemmas addressed within this literature can 
shed light on the ability of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to 
function simultaneously in motivating individuals in relationships 
and in other legal contexts. The interest in these questions becomes 
more important due to the developments in behavioral assumptions 
underlying rationality
9
 and the emergence of social norms literature
10
 
within the behavioral analysis of law literature.  
A. Dichotomous Compliance Motivations 
In the past, most of the research regarding compliance motivation 
was dichotomous in nature, with most of the discussion focused on 
 
 9. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1053–57 (2000) 
(analyzing the use of rationality theory and how it can be utilized in law to encourage socially 
desirable conduct); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (proposing an ―approach to the 
economic analysis of law that is informed by a more accurate conception of choice, one that 
reflects a better understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings‖). 
 10. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1787–88 (1996) (noting that 
both law and society literature document when a contractual relationship may not be the same 
as the legal rights in the contract based on the parties‘ acceptance of these changes because of 
social norms or commercial custom); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996) (arguing that norm management has an important place in 
law; that ―behavior is pervasively a function of norms; . . . that changes in norms might be the 
best way to improve social well-being; and that government deserves to have, and in any case 
inevitably does have, a large role in norm management‖); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (describing how neighbors settle 
disputes using informal norms and how these norms are generated). 
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which regulatory approach was more likely to lead to effective 
results. Deterrence, which seems to be most similar to extrinsic 
motivation, was the subject of most of the research.
11
 One of the most 
popular lines of research within this literature is related to the view 
that deterrence cannot account for the level of compliance seen 
today.
12
 In that regard, the most common response is to supplement 
deterrence with intrinsic factors—mainly duty, legitimacy, and 
morality.
13
 Indeed, many of the studies within this tradition focus not 
only on the limits of deterrence but also on the comparison of which 
of the mechanisms, deterrence or morality, is more effective in 
changing one‘s behavior.14 
 
 11  See, e.g., CHARLES R. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE QUESTION OF 
DETERRENCE (1980); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE 
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal 
Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 442, 442–43 (1976). 
 12. See Raymond Paternoster & Leeann Iovanni, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived 
Severity: A  Reexamination, 64 SOC. FORCES 751, 768–69 (1986) (arguing that both severity 
and certainty of punishment cannot account for any effect on delinquent behavior). Others are 
more modest in their arguments, but still demonstrate, through a review of many empirical 
studies, that deterrence cannot account for compliance. See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Toni 
Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 7, 
8–10, 29 (1991). Others have suggested that the problem was not motivational but rather 
cognitive, as people are not really cognizant of the law on the books. See, e.g., Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 
24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175–78 (2004).  
 13  See generally Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do 
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008) 
(discussing legitimacy as an encouragement to comply with the law); James L. Gibson, The 
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507 
(2007) (discussing how legitimacy can explain the continued loyalty to the Supreme Court); 
Michael Wenzel, The Impact of Outcome Orientation and Justice Concerns on Tax 
Compliance: The Role of Taxpayers’ Identity, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629 (2002) (examining 
justice considerations in explaining tax compliance). For an empirical demonstration of the 
limits of traditional economic models in the context of legal compliance, see Yuval Feldman & 
Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 985–86 
(2009). 
 14. For a classical, although criticized, study that takes this approach and demonstrates the 
advantage of morality over deterrence in encouraging honesty in tax reports, see Richard D. 
Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274, 283, 299 (1967). For a 
more general discussion, see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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B. Complex Compliance Motivations 
More sophisticated models have abandoned the ―which is better‖ 
approach and instead focus on creating a model that accounts for an 
interplay between both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Two main 
changes can be identified within this approach. First, today‘s models 
have far more than two types of motivation, as was the case with the 
more traditional scholarship. Second, we see the inclusion of types of 
motivation which could not be easily defined as either extrinsic or 
intrinsic. A classical demonstration of this approach can be seen in 
the work of Rob MacCoun on the dilemma of the legalization of 
marijuana.
15
 MacCoun presents, in a very systematic way, how 
multiple motivations and perceptions of behavior react to an 
announcement that a certain behavior is a criminal act.
16
 In the 
behavioral model that he develops, there are far more than two 
different types of motivations that take place in the decision of 
individuals to obey a given regulation.
17
 Indeed, it is common today 
to speak of a much larger number of competing compliance 
motivations. The interesting point in that regard is that many of these 
new models could not be categorized under either intrinsic or 
extrinsic motivations.  
A classical example of the inability to fully determine whether a 
motivation should be treated as extrinsic or intrinsic comes from the 
socially motivated individual who obeys the law according to what he 
or she believes others are doing.
18
 Within this compliance model, we 
have both intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of motivation. On the 
extrinsic level, models of reputation, signaling, and social 
enforcement are obviously external to the individual.
19
 On the other 
hand, social and group identities are deeply related to the conception 
 
 15. Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug 
Prohibition, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1993). 
 16. Id. at 497–506.  
 17. Id. at 506–08. 
 18. For further discussion of the relationship between social and other alternative 
compliance motivations, see Yuval Feldman, Five Models of Regulatory Compliance 
Motivation: Empirical Findings and Normative Implications, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATION (David Levi-Faur ed., forthcoming 2011).  
 19  See generally Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and 
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 138–43 (1996).  
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of self
20
 and, therefore, should be defined as intrinsic. Thus, 
portraying the social perspective as extrinsic or intrinsic will only 
provide a partial account for the true meaning of one‘s behavior.  
A similar definitional confusion arises with regard to fairness, 
which is usually viewed under a dichotomous approach as an intrinsic 
factor,
21
 but under a more sophisticated view could be viewed as a 
factor that has both intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics.
22
 Some 
argue that care for procedural fairness could be explained by identity-
related considerations,
23
 while others focus on theories such as the 
―Fairness Heuristics Theory‖24 that suggests that care for procedural 
justice is motivated by the need to approximate the likelihood of 
getting a satisfactory result.  
C. Mutual Influence Between the Models 
Many compliance models cannot be easily defined as driven by 
either extrinsic or intrinsic motivation. It is also not always clear 
whether these two types of motivations can function simultaneously. 
The majority of scholars, even those who come from the tradition of 
law and economics, are willing to accept the possibility of 
simultaneous functioning, without giving too much attention to the 
mutual influences of these motivations. For example, when Professor 
Robert Cooter discusses his view of the expressive function of the 
law, he illustrates what he views as the three main models of 
compliance, without giving much attention to the mutual influence 
 
 20. Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal 
Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 497–98 (1995). 
 21. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a 
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986).  
 22. E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice, Control, and Procedural 
Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 953 (1990). 
 23. TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 98 (1997). 
 24. For a discussion of the psychology of procedural and distributive justice viewed from 
the perspective of fairness heuristic theory, see E. Allan Lind, Fairness Heuristic Theory: 
Justice Judgments as Pivotal Cognitions in Organizational Relations, in ADVANCES IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 56 (Jerald Greenberg & Russell Cropanzano eds., 2001); Kees van 
den Bos, E. Allan Lind & Henk A. M. Wilke, The Psychology of Procedural and Distributive 
Justice Viewed From the Perspective of Fairness Heuristic Theory, 2 JUSTICE IN THE 
WORKPLACE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 49 (Russell Cropanzano ed., 2001).  
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between extrinsic and intrinsic models.
25
 Similar perspectives can be 
seen in the work of Professor Richard McAdams regarding the 
relationship between formal law and social norms.
26
 Even classical 
social psychologists like Herbert Kelman accept the existence of 
models where intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are both expected to 
be triggered (and thus function) simultaneously under the law and yet 
do not acknowledge their potential mutual influence.
27
  
Nonetheless, the aspect that seems to be somewhat undeveloped 
in each of the models above is the mutual influence between internal 
and external motivation. In that regard, one such dynamic that has 
received a lot of attention is how deterrence can change people‘s 
 
 25. Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and 
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000).  
Laws that have all three parts potentially have all three consequences. To illustrate, 
consider promulgating a law prohibiting a particular pollutant. The new law‘s 
pronouncement may make polluters expect that others will abate. If more abatement 
increases the social pressure on polluters, then the change in expectations might cause 
a jump to a new equilibrium (expressive effect). In addition, when the state attaches a 
sanction to polluting, some polluters will abate to avoid the sanction (deterrence 
effect). Finally, the legal explanation for this new obligation may convince some 
people to change their values and prefer to abate (internalization effect).  
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).  
It seems clear from the literature that economists would strongly prefer a single, 
unified way of introducing moral considerations into economic decision making . . . . 
Absent a major conceptual breakthrough, not in evidence in the literature reviewed, it 
seems likely that, in the end, a successful incorporation may require something beyond 
treating moral factors as only decision rules or only constraints or only preferences.  
William B. Griffith & Robert S. Goldfarb, Amending the Economist's “Rational Egoist” Model 
to Include Moral Values and Norms, Part 2: Alternative Solutions, in SOCIAL NORMS AND 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 59, 79–80 (Kenneth J. Koford & Jeffrey B. Miller eds., 1991). 
 26. ―[B]y norms this literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel 
obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-
legal sanctions, or both.‖ Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (second emphasis added).  
 27. See Herbert C. Kelman, Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three 
Processes of Attitude Change, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 51, 53 (1958). 
In any given instance, he may adhere to a rule or law out of compliance (he may obey 
the speed limit, for example, in order to avoid a traffic ticket), but he may have a 
general attitude of respect for a body of rules (such as the legal system) based on 
internalization, or a general self-image of a law-abiding citizen, based on 
identification. 
HEBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 114 (1989). 
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moral evaluation of an act. Zimring and Hawkins
28
 examine how 
punishment, traditionally seen as the price of doing the punished 
activity, may teach right and wrong
29
 (morality/internalization), habit 
building (internalization), and respect for the law (citizenship), as 
well as promote conformity (price).
30
 
Along those lines, in their research, Williams and Hawkins have 
reviewed the various studies and methodologies used to account for 
the effect of deterrence.
31
 While recognizing many of the limitations 
of current methodologies in separating the effect of deterrence from 
other factors that may be part of the behavioral effect, following a 
theoretical analysis conducted by others, such as Jack P. Gibbs, they 
suggest various constructs that may be affected by formal 
deterrence.
32
 They argue that the factors affected by formal 
deterrence include enculturation (respecting authorities), moral 
condemnation, and normative validation (seeing that others are being 
punished).
33
  
 
 28. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 74–88. 
 29. Fuller questions this perspective: ―The notion that its authorization to use physical 
force can serve to identify law and to distinguish it from other social phenomena is a very 
common one in modern writings.‖ LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 108 (rev. ed. 
1969). While Fuller himself does not take this view, the fact is, as even Fuller admits, the 
ability to use force is part of what distinguishes a legal norm from a social norm. That means 
that the deterrence has to be perceived to some extent in order for people to realize that that 
there is a law, and thus treat the announcement of the law as a legal act. Fuller himself does not 
think that ability to compel should be seen as one of the characteristics of the law. Id. He argues 
that focusing on hierarchies of law and the application of force does not take into account the 
important aspects of internal morality of the law, what should be the right solution, and so forth. 
Id. at 110–12. 
 30. One of the most surprising omissions is consensus in its prevalence form (as opposed 
to desirability). Elsewhere, I challenge this omission by illustrating that consensus has a greater 
mediating ability than price in the law‘s function as an educating principle. See Yuval Feldman, 
The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation, and 
Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 200–03 (2009). It is interesting to note that in 
their earlier writings, Zimring and Hawkins attempted to speculate on the possible means by 
which price, morality, and consensus interact from the perspective of state-initiated social 
control. See Frank Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, The Legal Threat as an Instrument of Social 
Change, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES 33 passim (1971). 
 31. Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: 
A Critical Review, 20 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 545 (1986) (presenting the various studies on 
deterrence and arguing that the findings are questionable because of a failure to recognize the 
complexity of the perceptual process). 
 32. See generally JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975). 
 33  See Williams & Hawkins, supra note 31, at 562. 
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In that regard, a classical demonstration of the effect of extrinsic 
motivations on intrinsic ones comes from Schwartz and Orleans, who 
have studied the interrelationship between fear of punishment and 
social duty. They have shown that those who were ―in a fear of 
punishment‖ group were more likely to feel normative obligations to 
pay taxes.
34
 Furthermore, evidence also exists for the opposite view, 
where intrinsic motivation affects an extrinsic one. Professors Scholz 
and Pinney have found that those with a stronger internal propensity 
to pay taxes had an increased perception as individuals that they are 
likely to be audited.
35
  
Overall, expressive models confuse the interrelationship between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Some scholars believe they 
complement each other, and some think they are substitutes. Thus, 
while these studies systematically explored the dynamics of the 
relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, the 
contradictory discussion of these mutual influences in studies that 
measure compliance demonstrates how complex it is to account for 
the influence between these two types of motivations.
36
 Lacking a 
clear and consistent account of the dynamics between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation will always undermine the coherence of any 
attempt to model the effect of law on behavior. Presumably, the next 
subsection, which focuses on ―crowding-out,‖ is a good 
demonstration of such an attempt, although the limits of this type of 
scholarship will be highlighted throughout its review.  
 
 34. Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 14, at 299–300. Paternoster and Iovanni found that 
perceived severity of deterrence did not have a deterrent effect. See Paternoster & Iovanni, 
supra note 12, at 768–70. 
 35. John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis 
of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 491 (1995). This is actually a correlation, not 
an interaction between the effects of moral duty and deterrence on intention to comply. See 
MacCoun, supra note 15, at 503–04 (focusing on the individual difference dimension and 
suggesting that the interaction between moral duty and deterrence flows in the opposite 
direction). 
 36. In a later paper, by comparing the responses of people with a comparable sense of 
duty to comply, Scholz and Lubell show that fear of punishment has an effect on compliance. 
See John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to 
Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 398, 405–13 (1998). 
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D. Crowding-Out  
The second literature that we will review in the process of 
understanding the interaction between love and money is the 
crowding-out literature. Most of the research conducted within this 
line of inquiry focuses on how and when external incentives (with a 
particular though not exclusive focus on money) may undermine 
people‘s internal motives.37  
It should be noted, however, that while the crowding-out literature 
is the leading one in this context, there are related paradigms that 
suggest similar results while relying on alternative theoretical 
structures. For example, Heyman and Ariely study the effect of 
money on behavior.
38
 In their paper, they explore how the type of 
external incentive (money vs. candy) provides signals to people as to 
the type of their relationships.
39
 According to Fiske‘s relational 
theory,
40
 Heyman and Ariely suggest that some external incentives 
may have completely different impacts, based on the context they 
give to a situation.
41
 While in monetary markets, there is a direct 
relationship between money and effort; in social markets, by contrast, 
the correlation between effort and compensation is less clear. This 
line of research demonstrates the importance of fairness and context 
in accounting for the effect of incentives on intrinsic motivation.
42
 
Using a different paradigm, Professors Vohs, Mead, and Goode 
employ mental priming techniques to study the unconscious effect of 
thinking about money.
43
 They demonstrate that thinking about money 
causes people to feel a greater sense of self-sufficiency, characterized 
by both a desire to not depend on others and a desire not to have 
 
 37. There are many studies within this tradition that focus on extrinsic motivations, such 
as deadlines. Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 627. Furthermore, much of the research 
in this line of reasoning has compared tangible and intangible external rewards, with a 
particular focus on comparing verbal and monetary incentives. See, e.g., id. at 656–57. 
 38  James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets, 15 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 787 (2004).  
 39. Id. at 787–89.  
 40. See id. at 792; see also Alan P. Fiske, The Four Elementary Forms of Sociality: 
Framework for a Unified Theory of Social Relations, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 689 (1992).  
 41. Heyman & Ariely, supra note 38, at 792.  
 42. Id. at 792–93.  
 43. Kathleen D. Vohs, Nicole L. Mead & Miranda R. Goode, The Psychological 
Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE 1154 (2006). 
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others depend on them. Illustrating that money diminishes relations 
between friends and family, they argue that money enhances 
individualism but diminishes communal motivations.
44
  
Thus, the view that money undermines intrinsic motivation is 
shared not only by the ―crowding-out‖ literature, but also by other 
lines of reasoning. Nevertheless, while one might interpret this fact to 
suggest that any form of monetary incentive may undermine the 
ability of intrinsic motivation (or love) to motivate behavior, a focus 
on the factors that moderate the effect of monetary incentives on 
intrinsic motivations may suggest a more multifaceted effect than one 
might assume.  
The ―crowding-out‖ literature suggests two competing behavioral 
explanations for the fact that, in many contexts, external motivation 
may undermine people‘s ability to rely on intrinsic motivation. The 
first and most studied model is related to motivation and was named 
the ―Cognitive Evaluation Theory‖ (―CET‖) by Deci and Ryan.45 
According to this perspective, when the individual views a reward as 
controlling, the reward harms the need for autonomy. In contrast, 
when the reward is viewed as providing satisfaction, it increases the 
need for competence.
46
 Based on this main distinction, CET serves as 
the basis for various predictions, such as the difference between 
verbal and tangible rewards.
47
 Although less central, the other 
behavioral explanation that accounts for the crowding-out effect is 
attribution. According to this theoretical perspective, external 
rewards create an over-justification effect whereby people assume 
that their deeds are due to the external rewards and not owing to their 
intrinsic motivations.
48
  
Social psychologists examining environmental morale have also 
discussed the crowding-out effect of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic 
 
 44. Id. at 1154–56.  
 45. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic 
Motivational Processes, 13 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 39, 61 (1980). 
 46. Id. at 67–68.  
 47. Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 638.  
 48. See, e.g., E. Tory Higgins & Yaacove Trope, Activity Engagement Theory: 
Implications of Multiply Identifiable Input for Intrinsic Motivation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 229, 240–43 (Richard M. 
Sorrentin & E. Tory Higgins eds., 1990). 
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motivation, calling it the ―hidden cost of reward.‖49 First, social 
psychologists suggest that one of the hidden costs of reward is a 
reduction in self-determination, which seems to be very similar to 
CET, the theory that when external awards are viewed to be 
controlling, the focus shifts from inside to outside the individual, thus
harming one‘s level of commitment. In contrast, when the external 
awards seem to be supportive, it increases intrinsic control as it 
acknowledges one‘s competence.50 Second, social psychologists note 
that extrinsic motivation can cause reciprocity to be violated. This 
second explanation is somewhat different than what is usually taken 
into account in psychology. According to this view, violation of 
reciprocity is responsible for the crowding-out effect, where a 
behavior that was done intrinsically is rewarded extrinsically.
51
  
Fehr claims that when people attribute their behavior to external 
rewards, they discount any moral incentives for their behavior, 
thereby lowering the perceived effect of intrinsic motivation.
52
 For 
instance, paying people in return for their blood might lead donors to 
view the event as a transaction rather than as a charitable act, thereby 
decreasing altruistic blood donations.
53
 In a series of lab-based 
experiments, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan found that tangible rewards 
undermine intrinsic motivation for a range of activities.
54
 They have 
 
 49. See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Environmental Morale and Motivation, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 406, 412–13 (Alan Lewis ed., 
2008).  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52  See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on 
Human Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 140 (2003); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive 
Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 1 (Inst. for Empirical Res. in Econ., Working 
Paper No. 34, 2002); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 
EUR. ECON. REV. 687, 710 (2002). For a general review, see BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR 
THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION (1997); Bruno S. Frey & 
Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence (CESifo, Working 
Paper No. 245, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=203330. 
 53. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY 158–64 (1971) (arguing that monetary payments to blood donors can diminish the 
amount of blood given voluntarily).  
 54. Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, The Undermining Effect Is a 
Reality After All—Extrinsic Rewards, Task Interest, and Self-Determination: Reply to 
Eisenberger, Pierce, and Cameron (1999) and Lepper, Henderlong, and Gingras (1990), 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 692, 699 (providing a meta-analysis and arguing that ―it is finally clear that 
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argued in their research that ―tangible rewards tend to have a 
substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivation.‖55 Therefore, 
they warn that attempts to externally control people‘s behavior may 
yield considerable long-term counterproductive results.
56
 
In addition, an important component of this theory recognizes that 
the effect of incentives is not linear and that intermediate levels of 
incentives are the most likely to curb value-driven behavior. In the 
context of incentives, there is a documented difference between 
small, intermediate, and high payoffs, with intermediate payoffs 
triggering crowding-out effects most often.
57
  
As demonstrated, while the original crowding-out literature was 
the subject of numerous theoretical follow-ups and refinements, it is 
important to mention two methodological and theoretical insights, 
which seem to be forgotten in much of the secondary literature, both 
in economics and in law. First, most of the original studies (which 
were the center of this line of reasoning) focused on ―level of 
interest‖ in an activity as the prototypical view of intrinsic 
motivation.
58
 In contrast, most of the studies which were built on this 
tradition in economics and law focused on other types of intrinsic 
motivations, such as moral duty, loyalty, and identity.
59
 Presumably, 
this difference should be attended to by those who believe that the 
type of intrinsic motivation may be relevant to the ease of crowding it 
out. A second distinction that may be relevant is whether we compare 
behavior with rewards to behaviors that are conducted under regimes 
where rewards have been removed or behaviors conducted under 
regimes where rewards were never present. It seems that the studies 
within the original crowding-out research were drawn more from the 
 
the accepted reality of the undermining effect is in fact a reality after all‖); see also Deci, 
Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 659. 
 55. Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 658–59.  
 56. See id. But see Robert Eisenberger, W. David Pierce & Judy Cameron, Effects of 
Reward on Intrinsic Motivation—Negative, Neutral, and Positive: Comment on Deci, Koestner, 
and Ryan (1999), 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 677 (1999) (―[R]eward can decrease, have no effect, or 
increase intrinsic motivation.‖). 
 57. See Frey & Stutzer, supra note 49, at 418–19. 
 58. See Deci & Ryan, supra note 45, at 42.  
 59. See, e.g., Fehr & Rockenbach, supra note 52, at 137; Fehr & Gächter, supra note 52, 
at 1; Fehr & Falk, supra note 52, at 688.  
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first type, while most of the refinements of this theory were drawn 
from the second type.
60
  
Finally, the potential effect of introducing monetary rewards 
depends not only on their interaction with internal motivation, but 
also on the conditions that are set to trigger the rewards‘ effect. 
Professors Gneezy and Rustichini used an experimental setting to 
explore whether fines may actually be interpreted as placing price 
tags on certain misconduct.
61
 In their study, they imposed a monetary 
fine on parents who were late picking up their child from a day-care 
center. After the introduction of the fine, they observed a steady 
increase in the number of parents coming in late.
62
 This result ran 
contrary to traditional deterrence models that predict that increasing 
the cost of an activity will necessarily decrease the rate at which it is 
performed. Gneezy and Rustichini suggested that the introduction of 
the fine may have changed parents‘ perception of the social dynamic 
between themselves and the day-care center. That is, when the act of 
arriving late was previously wrong in and of itself, the introduction of 
a fine may have allowed parents to rationalize the fine as a price for 
arriving late. According to this logic, as long as they paid the price 
for such behavior, parents felt comfortable being late.
63
  
Doron Teichman and I attempted to understand the theoretical 
mechanisms that undermine how framing monetary incentives can 
alter their function.
64
 In particular, we identified three factors that 
caused legal payments to be viewed as prices while substituting for 
the intrinsic inhibition to engage in wrongdoing. One dimension we 
examined was related to uncertainty.
65
 As in other settings, people 
dislike uncertainty with respect to legal payments.
66
 In our study, we 
 
 60  Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 630. 
 61. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (2000). 
 62. Id. at 5–8. 
 63. Id. at 13–15. 
 64. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All “Legal Dollars” Created Equal?, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 223, 225 (2008).  
 65. Id.  
 66. See Craig R. Fox & Martin Weber, Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and 
Decision Context, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 476, 477 
(2002); Shawn P. Curley, J. Frank Yates & Richard A. Abrams, Psychological Sources of 
Ambiguity Avoidance, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 230–
31 (1986); Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic 
Inference, 92 PSYCHOL. REV. 433, 435 (1985).  
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demonstrated that people perceived probabilistic payments as less 
moral and less acceptable than defined payments.
67
 ―Furthermore, 
participants were less willing to engage in a harmful activity when a 
probabilistic element was added to otherwise equal legal 
payments.‖68  
A second element we focused on was related to the timing of 
payment. In accordance with our predictions, paying before a harmful 
act rather than after reduced the negative perception of the payment 
and increased the willingness of people to engage in the harmful 
activity. ―In the private setting, ex ante payments could imply consent 
that was granted in return for the legal payment, thereby justifying 
the act. Ex post payments to individuals, on the other hand, do not 
imply consent, and therefore sustain the perception of the act as 
forbidden.‖69  
Finally, the third and most important factor we discovered in 
changing the meaning of legal payment was when it was assigned to 
the individual who was harmed by the act, rather than to a third party. 
Compensation brought the parties closer to a market-based 
relationship, particularly when the injured parties suffered only 
financial losses. In the terminology of our paper, the external 
incentives removed the intrinsic inhibition to cause harm to others.
70
  
Overall, in our study, three important factors were found to be 
responsible for making payments be viewed more as a price than as a 
fine: the timing of the payment, identity of the recipient, and certainty 
of the payment. When paying in advance to the injured party or after 
the fact but with certainty, the payment was more likely to be viewed 
as a price that justified ignoring the internal motivation. When 
payments were uncertain, made to a governmental entity, or, in 
 
 67. Feldman & Teichman, supra note 64, at 248. While this effect was consistent across 
all measures, it was not significant in all of them. The lack of significance across all measures 
may be explained by the fact that rational individuals were expected to strictly prefer the 
probabilistic option, given the fact that we held the size of the sanction constant. 
 68. Id. Similarly, uncertainty in the probability of being convicted of a crime makes 
people less willing to commit crimes. Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the 
Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2006); Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, 
Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of 
Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276, 304 (1999). 
 69. Feldman & Teichman, supra note 64, at 248.  
 70. Id. at 249.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations 29 
 
 
particular, made after the fact, they were more likely to be seen as 
fines. As legal payments shifted from the price side of the continuum 
to the punishment side, people began to see the payment-triggering 
activity as less moral, and as a result, they were less willing to engage 
in it.
71
 The importance of these dimensions was exacerbated when 
considering the criticism against the child care experiment. The 
common criticism was that fines in the experiments were too low.
72
 
In our view, the perspective we took in our study enriches the 
understanding of factors that people view as important in making 
fines into payment, making it more reasonable for critics of this 
paradigm to accept the rationale of the surprising results of the child 
care study.  
E. Misperception of What Motivates Self vs. Others 
The last behavioral literature that could improve our 
understanding of how intrinsic and extrinsic motivation will interact 
in legal contexts and relationships is related to the gap in perception 
of what is the dominant motivation that underlies the behavior of self 
compared to the behavior of others. The importance of understanding 
this gap is applicable to both the relationship of and the interaction 
between individuals in society. In a relationship, one can easily 
accept the fact that when one side of a relationship believes the other 
is motivated by self-interest, one‘s own intrinsic motivation is going 
to be harmed. This belief leads the perceptual effect to become real. 
Nevertheless, even on a societal level, when people view other‘s 
behavior as being motivated by self-interest, they may respond 
accordingly.
73
 Thus, if money is perceived to have a greater effect on 
others as opposed to oneself in the long run, the perceived motivation 
of others may harm one‘s own intrinsic motivation. It is possible that 
even if people underestimate the effect of money on their own 
 
 71. Id. at 248–50.  
 72. Ariel Rubinstein, Discussion of “Behavioral Economics,‖ in ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS 246 
(Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey & Torsten Persson eds., 2006). 
 73. For a formal demonstration of the effect of misperception on stable changes in 
behavior, see Robert Cooter, Michal Feldman & Yuval Feldman, The Misperception of Norms: 
The Psychology of Bias and the Economics of Equilibrium, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 889 (2008).  
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behavior, the fact that it is perceived to have an overestimated effect 
on others may mean that the destructive effect of money may become 
even more so in people‘s self-perception.  
Indeed, many scholars have theorized that there is a strong 
tendency for people to think that others will engage in more selfish 
courses of actions, in comparison to themselves. This has actually 
been documented as the ―Muhammad Ali Effect.‖74 Simply put, it 
means that people are more likely to think that they are fairer than 
others than that they are smarter.
75
 This differentiation may be 
explained by the fact that people's positive beliefs about themselves 
may be constrained by the publicity, specificity, and objectivity of the 
dimensions on which these beliefs are held.
76
  
Another important concept among the theories that support the 
perceptual gap with regard to ethical behavior is the norm of self-
interest.
77
 This concept works in conjunction with the empirically 
established finding that people often tend to believe that the 
governing social norms are instrumentally driven even when 
statistical analysis does not corroborate such a conviction.
78
 In a long 
 
 74  See Scott T. Allison, David M. Messick & George R. Goethals, On Being Better but 
Not Smarter Than Others: The Muhammad Ali Effect, 7 SOC. COGNITION 275, 291 (1989).  
 75. Id. at 276. For further replication of this effect in the context of interpersonal 
relationship, see generally Paul Van Lange, Being Better but Not Smarter Than Others: The 
Muhammad Ali Effect at Work in Interpersonal Situations, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 689 (1991).  
 76. Allison, Messick & Goethals, supra note 74, at 277–78.  
 77. See generally Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1053, 
1053 (1999) (examining ―the role the assumption of self-interest plays in its own 
confirmation‖). 
 78. See generally Catherine A. Sanderson & John M. Darley, ―I Am Moral, But You Are 
Deterred”: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 375 (2002) (arguing that people attribute their own obedience to laws to internal 
factors like beliefs and morals, while they assume that external factors like fear of punishment 
motivate criminals). Elsewhere, I have demonstrated that engineers in Silicon Valley tend to 
overestimate the percentage of engineers who divulge trade secrets. See Yuval Feldman, 
Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative Failures: Divulging of Trade Secrets by 
Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 J.L. TECH. & POL‘Y 105, 153–54; see also Dale T. Miller & 
Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53 (1998). The studies discussed in this Article examine the 
hypothesis that people overestimate the influence of self-interest on attitudes and behaviors. For 
example, participants overestimated the impact that financial rewards exerted on their peers' 
willingness to donate blood. In addition, the fact that participants overestimated the impact of 
self-interest on others was largely unrelated to the impact that it had on participants' own 
attitudes and behaviors. Id. at 54. 
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series of studies, Professor Miller has shown that much of the effect 
of self-interest on behavior is related to a widely shared cultural view 
that this is the way people ought to behave.
79
 More specifically, in the 
context of legal compliance, Professor Sanderson and Darley, have 
developed the concept of ―I am moral, but you are deterred,‖ which 
demonstrates how people differ in the view of what motivates others 
vs. self in the context of legal compliance.
80
 Many psychological 
studies support the conclusion that people attribute too much 
undesirable behavior by others to fixed character traits in the actors 
and attribute too little to their behavior in a given social situation. 
Buckley, Harvey, and Beu suggest that this ―fundamental attribution 
error‖ plays a role in overestimating the amount of wrongdoing by 
others.
81
 According to their study, most people are ethical with 
occasional lapses. Thoroughly unscrupulous people are an 
exceptional minority. The fundamental attribution error could cause a 
person who witnessed wrongdoing to conclude that the actor usually 
does wrong, whereas the correct conclusion in most cases is that the 
actor occasionally lapses.
82
 
Among the causes for this gap in perception of ethics is the media, 
providing one of the simplest explanations for overestimating 
wrongdoing.
83
 Put simply, immoral events get more media coverage 
 
 79. Miller, supra note 77, at 1053; see also Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The 
Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 21–22 (1995) (describing the development and 
the consequences of correspondence bias on behavior). 
 80. See Sanderson & Darley, supra note 78, at 375–76, 400–01.  
 81. See Jonathan R.B. Halbesleben, M. Ronald Buckley & Nicole D. Sauer, The Role of 
Pluralistic Ignorance in Perceptions of Unethical Behavior: An Investigation of Attorneys' and 
Students' Perceptions of Ethical Behavior, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV. 17, 18 (2004). The 
fundamental attribution error is the basis of the pluralistic ignorance phenomenon, implying that 
people may fail to account for others‘ true motivations in engaging in various behaviors. M. 
Ronald Buckley, Michael G. Harvey & Danielle S. Beu, The Role of Pluralistic Ignorance in 
the Perception of Unethical Behavior, 23 J. BUS. ETHICS 353, 354–55 (2000). 
 82. Buckley, Harvey & Beu, supra note 81, at 355–56. For an economic model that 
develops the effect of attribution biases, see Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, 
Words that Kill? An Economic Model of the Influence of Speech on Behavior (with Particular 
Reference to Hate Speech), 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 119–20 (2005). 
 83. While psychological research on television violence tends to focus more on 
entertainment television, the daily news is even more heavily watched and also contains 
extreme and realistic violent content. See Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, The 
Construction of Social Norms and Standards, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC 
PRINCIPLES 799, 808 (Edward Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996) (discussing the 
role of the media in the phenomenon of the ―spiral of silence‖). 
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than moral ones. Lichtenberg and MacLean demonstrate that much of 
what the media reports is bad news.
84
 In one study, Professor Johnson 
analyzed four different types of TV news programs (national network 
news, local news, independent news, and cable network news) for 
violence-type, conflict, and suffering.
85
 Over one hundred programs 
were analyzed over a six-month period. The authors discovered an 
emphasis on news that was bad or violent.
86
 The media also depicts 
immorality (including lying, adultery, robbery, and fraud) more than 
morality.
87
 Furthermore, according to the theory of ―automatic 
vigilance,‖ individuals who respond to undesirable social stimuli gain 
an evolutionary advantage.
88
 As a result, undesirable stimuli attract 
more attention than desirable social stimuli,
89
 especially when the 
source is undesirable behavior by others.
90
  
 
 84. See Judith Lichtenberg & Douglas MacLean, Is Good News No News?, 17 GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 362, 362 (1992); see also Gideon Koren & Naomi Klein, Bias Against 
Negative Studies in Newspaper Reports of Medical Research, 266 J. AM. MED. ASS‘N 1824 
(1991). Koren and Klein also show the extent of the media‘s coverage of bad news in their 
comparison of news coverage using two scientific studies, one focused on bad news and one on 
good news. The studies compared by Koren and Klein investigated the relationship between 
radiation exposure and cancer. Id. at 1824. The ―bad news‖ study showed an increased risk of 
leukemia in white men working at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The ―good news‖ study 
failed to show an increased risk of cancer in people residing near nuclear facilities. Id. at 1825. 
Koren and Klein found that subsequent newspaper coverage was far greater for the study 
showing increased risk of cancer in people residing near nuclear facilities. Id. at 1826.  
 85. See Roger N. Johnson, Bad News Revisited: The Portrayal of Violence, Conflict, and 
Suffering on Television News, 2 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 201 (1996).  
 86. Id. at 207. Analyzing parameters of time allocation and amount of featured news 
stories, more than half (53.4 percent) of the news displayed violence, conflict, and suffering. 
Bad news was also given greater emphasis by being featured earlier in the programs. While 
local news broadcasted the most bad news, all four program types were found to emphasize bad 
news. Id. 
 87. For an example of media portrayal of immorality, see Del Jones, Doing the WRONG 
Thing: 48% of Workers Admit to Unethical or Illegal Acts, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 1997, at 1A. 
 88. See Felicia Pratto & Oliver P. John, Automatic Vigilance: The Attention-Grabbing 
Power of Negative Social Information, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 380, 380 (1991). 
 89. There is a fundamental asymmetry in people's evaluations of gains and losses, of joy 
and pain, and of positive and negative events. A considerable body of research in fields as 
diverse as decision-making, impression formation, and emotional communication has shown 
that people exhibit loss aversion and assign relatively more value, importance, and weight to 
events that have negative, rather than positive, implications for them. See, e.g., Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 
(1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices]. In decisionmaking, potential costs are 
more influential than potential gains. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979) [hereinafter 
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]. In impression formation, negative information is 
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Another possible source of this gap is more emotional than 
cognitive. A wrongdoer may protect his self-esteem by exaggerating 
how frequently others commit the same wrong.
91
 Relevant concepts 
invoked by psychologists include social validation, self-enhancing 
biases, and constructive social comparison.
92
 This last view, that the 
source of the bias is more likely to be related to bias in the perception 
of self rather than bias in the perception of others, is supported by the 
―holier than thou‖ argument.93 Through an extensive review, this 
relatively recent paradigm recognizes that the bulk of studies have 
supported the view that people think that they are more moral than 
others. A commonly used demonstration of this gap is that a majority 
 
weighted more heavily than positive information. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Attention and 
Weight in Person Perception: The Impact of Negative and Extreme Behavior, 38 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 889, 891 (1980); Norman H. Anderson, Information 
Integration Theory: A Brief Survey, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN MATHEMATICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY VOLUME II: MEASUREMENT, PSYCHOPHYSICS, AND NEURAL INFORMATION 
PROCESSING 236 (David H. Krantz et al. eds., 1974); David L. Hamilton & Mark P. Zanna, 
Differential Weighting of Favorable and Unfavorable Attributes in Impressions of Personality, 
6 J. EXPERIMENTAL RES. IN PERSONALITY 204 (1972). In nonverbal communication, people are 
more responsive to negatively toned messages than to positive ones. See Ann M. Frodi, Michael 
E. Lamb, Lewis A. Leavitt & Wilberta L. Donovan, Fathers’ and Mothers’ Responses to Infant 
Smiles and Cries, 1 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 187, 192, 195–96 (1978).  
 90. See John J. Skowronski & Donal E. Carlston, Negativity and Extremity Biases in 
Impression Formation: A Review of Explanations, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 131 (1989). This 
concept is related to impression formation—the fact that unfavorable characteristics are 
weighted more heavily than favorable ones in initial formation of an assessment toward an 
object. See id. at 139. Results showed that likability ratings of a person associated with an 
unfavorable attribute were significantly more incongruous with a neutral impression than were 
ratings of a person associated with a desirable attribute. Id. at 131–32. Additionally, subjects 
were more confident in their likability ratings of the people with negative stimuli. Id. at 131. It 
is certainly plausible to equate unethical traits/information with negative traits/information 
when it comes to impression formation. 
 91. See, e.g., Wenzel, supra note 13, at 639 (arguing that in taxation compliance, people 
feel they underreport because they believe everyone else underreports).  
 92. See Jerry Suls & C. K. Wan, In Search of the False-Uniqueness Phenomenon: Fear 
and Estimates of Social Consensus, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211 (1987) (positing 
that individuals have a motivational interpretation that enhances their need to justify and 
compare their level of fear to others); see also Ladd Wheeler, Motivation as a Determinant of 
Upward Comparison, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 27 (Supp. 1 1966) (examining the 
social comparison theory). 
 93. See Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling “Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving 
Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 861 (2000). Professors Epley and Dunning study the tendency of people to believe 
that they are more likely to engage in selfless and generous behavior than others (―holier than 
thou‖). Epley and Dunning conclude that people overestimate in the prediction of their own 
behavior, while they are more accurate in predicting the behavior of others. Id. at 873.  
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of Americans believe they are in a highly ―moral minority.‖94 
Professors Epley and Dunning have taken this a step further and 
explored an important quandary with special relevance to this Article: 
Do people think that others are worse than they are in reality, or do 
people think they themselves are better than others in reality? What 
they have found is that people are very accurate with regard to others, 
but actually think that they themselves are more likely to engage in 
various ethical acts.
95
 In our context, this means that in reality, if 
others behave ethically, people are not likely to ignore this fact.
96
 
According to their view (which should receive higher credibility for 
measuring actual behaviors of people), one can presumably expect no 
deteriorating effect on intrinsic motivation, as people only possess an 
overly positive view of themselves, and not a more negative 
perspective of others.
97
 
A more refined view, however, may question this assumption for 
a few reasons. First, the mere fact that there is a gap, even if people 
are accurate about others, might undermine people‘s incentives to 
engage in socially desirable behavior, due to mechanisms such as the 
―sucker effect.‖98 Second, the causes for gaps between levels of 
ethicality do not completely undermine all mechanisms that were 
developed in this context, as the gap is only part of a more elaborate 
 
 94. See id. at 862; see also Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, The Mixed Blessings of 
Self-Knowledge in Behavioral Prediction: Enhanced Discrimination but Exacerbated Bias, 32 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 641, 651 (2006) (finding that when predicting their own 
behavior, people rely on specific self-knowledge, ignoring any other information that may make 
their predictions more accurate).  
 95. See Epley & Dunning, supra note 93, at 861–62.  
 96. Epley and Dunning find many methodological problems in some of the studies cited 
above. Id. at 861–62. Therefore, their criticism is relevant to my own cited research on trade 
secrets and whistle-blowing.  
 97. But see Nicholas Epley, Eugene M. Caruso & Max H. Bazerman, When Perspective 
Taking Increases Taking: Reactive Egoism in Social Interaction, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 872, 886 (2006) (discussing the phenomenon that they term ―Reactive Egoism,‖ in 
which individuals‘ consideration of other people‘s thoughts and perspectives leads them to 
engage in less socially diverse behavior). 
 98. The sucker effect is the phenomenon in which some individuals will reduce their 
individual effort when working on a group task because they fear becoming, or being seen as, a 
―sucker.‖ For a broader discussion, see generally Norbert L. Kerr, Motivation Losses in Small 
Groups: A Social Dilemma Analysis, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819 (1983); Mel E. 
Schnake, Equity in Effort: The “Sucker Effect” in Co-Acting Groups, 17 J. MGMT. 41 (1991). 
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view of why certain aspects of people‘s behavior are more likely to 
be accessible.  
In conclusion, the gap between self and others adds an additional 
behavioral complexity to the relationship between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. Professor Pronin, who reviews the 
evolutionary, perceptional, developmental, and neurological reasons 
for this gap, concludes that ―[w]hen people judge themselves based 
on their good intentions but others based on their less-good behavior 
(or based on cynical assumptions about human nature), they are 
likely to feel resentful and disappointed over others‘ failure to meet 
them halfway.‖99  
The gap between what one does and what others do and its effect 
on the intrinsic-extrinsic tension in human motivation were examined 
in two empirical studies I have conducted on employees in the United 
States.
100
 In the first study, I examined Silicon Valley employees‘ 
views of the behavior of others in the context of divulgence of trade 
secrets, given the limited enforcement of such behavior.
101
 The 
findings show that employees thought that others were significantly 
more likely than they themselves to engage in divulging trade secrets. 
Furthermore, when people were less familiar with the ―others‖, they 
were more likely to believe that others were pursuing their narrow 
self-interest (this was measured through a comparison of perceived 
proportion of employees who divulge trade secrets in one‘s own firm 
and that of the perceived proportion of employees in Silicon Valley 
in general).
102
  
In a more recent joint paper with Orly Lobel that attempted to 
examine how to motivate whistle-blowers, we provided evidence of a 
similar phenomenon in the context of intrinsic motivation.
103
 In that 
study, participants predicted that they would be more likely to report 
on their employer than would their non-workplace peers, and that 
their workplace peers would be more likely to report than most other 
people. In other words, individuals believe that ―they themselves will 
 
 99. Emily Pronin, How We See Ourselves and How We See Others, 320 SCIENCE 1177, 
1180 (2008).  
 100. See Feldman, supra note 78; Feldman & Lobel, supra note 7. 
 101. See Feldman, supra note 78, at 106.  
 102. Id. at 160.  
 103. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 7, at 1190.  
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behave more ethically in the face of misconduct than others and that 
people with whom they are familiar will behave more ethically than 
the general population.‖104 With regard to others, especially non-
peers, respondents felt that high monetary rewards would serve as a 
much stronger motivator than a duty to report.
105
 Even exercising 
caution as a result of the arguments by Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman, 
as discussed above, such findings suggest a challenge to the interplay 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. If the frustration from the 
gap and biased social norms may shift peoples' behavior and reliance 
upon their own intrinsic motives, then accounting for the factors 
which determine this gap is desired.
106
  
Based on the three bodies of literature discussed so far, the third 
part of the Article will proceed to examine some more policy-relevant 
empirical studies. These studies explore the relationship between 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in various legal and policy-oriented 
contexts.  
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL POLICY MAKING  
The complexity of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation presented in this Article may cause the reader to feel that 
the government is left with no real options as to how to take 
advantage of behavioral knowledge in attempting to shape an 
individual‘s motivation rather than behavior. The criticism we raised 
with regard to current paradigms may create the impression of a 
―messy‖ literature, leaving the policy-maker without a clear route of 
action. In many ways, this review of the current literature suggests 
that the effect of law on intrinsic motivation is more complex than 
was commonly assumed. At the same time, our behavioral focus does 
suggest that motivation is an important factor in accounting for the 
efficacy of regulatory impact, as behaviors done out of intrinsic 
motives are superior by most accounts to those conducted under 
extrinsic ones.
107
 To prevent that perspective, the following 
 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 1198–99.  
 106. See Epley et al., supra note 97 (discussing ―reactive egoism‖).  
 107. See, e.g., Deci & Ryan, supra note 1, at 233–34 (implying that intrinsic motivation is 
superior to extrinsic).  
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paragraphs will highlight some insights and refinements that will 
carry with them the potential for concrete policy recommendations. 
In particular, the suggested solutions will attempt to examine how the 
law may make use of the blurred distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation, the multiple motivations approach to legal 
compliance, and the inability to have an accurate perception of 
oneself relative to promoting socially desirable behaviors.  
Four constructs will be the focus of this part. First, we look at the 
ability of the policy-maker to frame legal incentives in a way to 
behaviorally tune the relevant theories, discussed above, regarding 
the dynamics of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. Second, we examine the possibility of tailoring the type 
of legal instrument to the level of intrinsic motivation of the typical 
individual in that context. Third, we examine whether legal 
intervention carries similar effects as monetary intervention. In this 
context, the focus will be on the factors that moderate whether legal 
intervention is always viewed as carrying a similar crowding-out 
effect as occurs with the usage of monetary instruments. Finally, we 
examine whether legal ambiguity can serve to countervail some of 
the disruptive effects of extrinsic considerations on the functioning of 
intrinsic motivations. In each of these contexts, findings that I 
accumulated through a series of joint studies will be used to illustrate 
the advantages of policy-making, which will be sensitive to the 
behavioral implications of the interplay between extrinsic vs. intrinsic 
motivations.  
A. Framing of Legal Incentives 
The first and most discussed series of steps in which the legal 
policy-maker can engage in this context is related to framing. Given 
the ability of the legal policy-maker to control the language used to 
describe legal incentives, there is great potential that can be gained 
from understanding framing when intrinsic motivation is taken into 
account. There seems to be a consensus among scholars who study 
the effect of legal incentives on behaviors that the framing of 
incentives may affect whether such incentives interact with the 
functioning of intrinsic motivation. Although traditional economic 
analysis would consider fines and pricing as equivalent if they entail 
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the same amount of payment, it has been shown that in reality, the 
way payments are framed matters significantly.
108
 For example, Fehr 
and Gächter found that when monetary incentives were framed as a 
price reduction, they had a greater effect than when they were framed 
as a bonus.
109
 Similarly, Frey and Stutzer have argued that both 
tradable emission rights and emission taxes could create a crowding-
out effect, but the former has a strong crowding-out effect, while the 
latter‘s crowding-out effect is much smaller.110 
In that regard, there is a growing body of research in both social 
psychology and behavioral economics that indicates that people 
respond better to incentives than to penalties.
111
 From collaborative 
studies with which I have been involved, however, it seems that the 
advantage of awards over fines is not true in all contexts, and 
definitely not for all the dimensions that we may care about in legal 
compliance. Indeed, in a joint work with Oren Perez,
112
 we observed 
that in an environmental context, when testing the usage of deposits 
vs. fines in encouraging recycling, there seemed to be a consistent 
advantage of deposits over fines,
113
 both in efficacy as well as in 
perceived social and legal desirability.  
The ability to choose seems to be the main advantage of deposits 
over fines; however, this is context-dependent. In some 
circumstances, fines—which give the individual less choice—may 
seem more desirable in comparison to a reward, especially with 
regard to behaviors whose desirability is more controversial. Such 
findings can be found in a recent joint working paper conducted with 
 
 108. See Fehr & Gächter, supra note 52, at 30–31. 
 109  See id. at 31.  
 110. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 49.  
 111  For an example of social psychology explaining behavioral change with respect to the 
environment, see Raymond De Young, Changing Behavior and Making It Stick: The 
Conceptualization and Management of Conservation Behavior, 25 ENV‘T & BEHAV. 485, 497–
98 (1993) (arguing that while penalties create behavior change, they also bring negative effects, 
such as creative misbehavior). 
 112. See Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, Motivating Environmental Action in a 
Heterogeneous Regulatory Environment (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 113. In the deposit system, consumers pay a deposit on each container they buy, which is 
returned to them when they return the container. F(4,732)=8.15, p<.001, η2=.04. Obviously, 
deposits and awards are similar concepts and the relationship between them requires further 
discussion. Id. at 23. 
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Orly Lobel on how to incentivize whistle-blowers.
114
 In that context, 
those who reported under a regime of fines were seen as more
socially desirable than those who did it under a regime of awards.
115
 
Thus, the ability to choose was seen in this context as opportunistic, 
supposedly due to the general controversy of the loyalty issue at stake 
when one uncovers corruption in one‘s own organization.  
Not only is the effect of framing of fines vs. awards/deposits 
context-dependent in some cases, but we can also see that framing 
has no effect even when individuals are fully aware of the different 
meanings of the various legal instruments. For example, in an earlier 
study conducted with Oren Perez, we examined the effect of choice 
of legal instrument on public willingness to engage in civic 
enforcement against pollution by factories.
116
 The findings showed 
that there was no difference between tax and fines in terms of their 
effect on reduction of moral outrage toward the pollution.
117
 Thus, 
framing is obviously important, but in some cases, the public will 
care more about the fact that money was paid rather than on the title 
given to a particular payment. This is especially interesting when 
considering the fact that from a formal legal perspective, there is a 
dramatic difference between those who pay fines due to violation of 
the law and those who pay taxes in accordance with the law. Thus, 
framing does not always prevail over the pure monetary effects of 
law, especially with regard to contexts where the law is not expected 
to affect compliance but rather enforcement of noncompliance by 
others. In that regard, the lack of effect of legal framing creates a 
challenge for measuring the magnitude of the expressive function of 
the law, which tends to view the meaning rather than the cost 
imposed by the law as its more important artifact.
118
  
In summary, framing is naturally a promising policy route when 
intrinsic motivation is taken into account. Even when considering 
only three legal contexts, however, it can be seen that the ability to 
 
 114. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 7. 
 115. Id. at 1199–1200.  
 116. Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes the Environmental Mind: An 
Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral Perceptions and Civic Enforcement, 
36 J.L. & SOC‘Y 501 (2009).  
 117. Id. at 526–27.  
 118. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 7, at 1183–84.  
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generalize from one setting to another is limited, and context-
sensitive empirical research is needed.  
B. Differentiated Regulation and Individual Differences: 
Heterogeneity in Intrinsic Motivations 
The second aspect I will examine with regard to intrinsic vs. 
extrinsic motivations is related to individual differences in the level 
of intrinsic motivation toward a certain act. It seems that the 
differences in the effect of monetary incentives on different 
individuals could theoretically be expected both with regard to 
magnitude as well as with regard to the framing of the monetary 
incentives.  
Following the ―W effect‖ described by Gneezy119 with regard to 
magnitude, there is room to expect that with varying levels of 
intrinsic motivations among individuals, various sums of money will 
have a different effect on each subgroup. Indeed, in a paper with 
Perez, we have demonstrated a full interaction of the effect of high 
and low fines on an individual‘s willingness to engage in recycling.120 
The findings demonstrate that those who place a higher emphasis on 
environmental commitment are more likely to recycle when fines are 
lower. For those who place a lower emphasis on environmental 
commitment, the effect is reversed and higher fines have a stronger 
effect.
121
 Thus, not only do we find evidence for the W effect 
(differences between small and intermediate payoffs), we also see 
that it changes according to the level of intrinsic commitment by 
participants.  
Other than the magnitude of the monetary incentive, its framing 
may also be accepted differently according to one‘s level of intrinsic 
motivation. Those who are intrinsically motivated may view reward 
in a different way than those with lower intrinsic motivation. In that 
context, Lobel and I demonstrated that those who were intrinsically 
 
 119  Uri Gneezy, The W Effects of Incentives (Oct. 13, 2003), http://cramton.umd.edu/ 
workshop/papers/gneezy-w-effect-of-incentives.pdf. In this case, intrinsic motivation was 
measured on a scale of environmental commitment as well as sensitivity to the distance from 
one‘s home to a recycling bin. 
 120. See Feldman & Perez, supra note 116, at 4.  
 121. Id. at 27.  
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motivated were not significantly affected by framing, while those 
who were low on intrinsic motivation were affected by some types of 
extrinsic motivation.
122
 Perez and I developed a somewhat different 
finding regarding the differences in perception of incentives by those 
with high and low motivation, demonstrating that those who were 
low on intrinsic motivation were more likely to prefer deposits to 
fines, while the opposite was true for those who were high on 
intrinsic motivation.
123
  
These findings, which suggest that the level of intrinsic 
motivation does indeed significantly moderate the effect of extrinsic 
motivation, raise the following questions: What should the policy-
maker do with these insights? Who should be targeted—those who 
are internally committed or those who are not?
124
 A few approaches 
can be examined to deal with this puzzle. One approach may suggest 
that we need to focus only on those individuals lacking an internal 
commitment, given that, as shown in this Article, those are the 
individuals who tend to be more sensitive to variation in the framing 
of extrinsic motivation. Thus, in terms of efficacy, it is clear that 
focusing more on those who are lower on their intrinsic level may 
carry greater behavioral change. Furthermore, with regard to those 
with limited intrinsic motivation, there is a lesser need to account for 
the crowding-out effect, given that those individuals are not 
intrinsically motivated to begin with. Nevertheless, a more 
comprehensive perspective on this issue may suggest that the main 
factor to consider is context, and more specifically, the proportion of 
people whose desirable behavior is sought.  
 
 122. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 7, at 1191. 
 123. Id.  
 124. While preparing the revised version of this draft, I came across a working paper by 
some of the leading regulation scholars (Gunningham and Sinclair) who similarly suggest that 
―those who are differently motivated are likely to respond very differently to a deterrence 
strategy. While it may be effective when applied to the recalcitrant and perhaps to reluctant 
compliers it will be counter-productive as regards OHS leaders . . . and irrelevant to the 
incompetent.‖ Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Multiple OHS Inspection Tools: Balancing 
Deterrence and Compliance in the Mining Sector 6 (Nat‘l Research Ctr. for OHS Regulation, 
Working Paper No. 55, 2007). Nevertheless, they treat this challenge as too complex from a 
legal policy-making perspective: ―But inspectors are for the most part, incapable of knowing 
the motivation of those they are regulating, with the result that a ‗pure‘ deterrence strategy may 
achieve very mixed results.‖ Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:11 
 
 
There seems to be a basic typology of three situations. The first 
type is where only a certain portion of the population is needed, as in 
the context of whistle-blowing. There is no need for every employee 
in an organization to be motivated to disclose wrongdoing. Trying to 
interest everyone to divulge a fraud may be unnecessary, while the 
cost of targeting everyone may have an inadvertent effect on the 
intrinsic motivation of those we primarily care about. Furthermore, in 
such a context, we are also interested in why people do what they do, 
not only that they actually do it. In some of the other behaviors, such 
as recycling, however, it is less important to know whether people 
recycle due to intrinsic or extrinsic reasons. In contrast, in the context 
of whistle-blowing, we see a dramatic difference between those who 
blow the whistle for extrinsic reasons and those who only report 
types of behaviors expected to be less harmful to the individual 
personally, without regard to the level of harm to the organization.
125
 
To counter this, it may actually be an advantage to have only a few 
employees come forward with such allegations.  
An example for the second type is trade secrets, where everyone 
needs to be motivated, as the few people who will not be affected by 
the legal instrument may make it futile to keep company knowledge 
proprietary. In that context, we have to focus on the lowest common 
denominator, meaning that those with the lowest level of intrinsic 
motivation to be loyal to the company should be the focus of the 
regulation.  
Finally, an example for the third type is recycling. In that context, 
we want as many people as possible to recycle. In this case, it does 
not matter whether some people with no intrinsic motivation choose 
not to recycle, as that would not jeopardize the motivation of others 
who choose to recycle. In that case, we may want to motivate both 
populations, with no specific preference as to those without intrinsic 
motivation, because as long as plastic bottles are put into the 
designated recycling containers, the quality of recycling (in contrast 
to quality of whistle-blowing) is less likely to be affected by the level 
of passion associated with the act.  
 
 125. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An 
Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165, 180 (2008) (discussing employees‘ 
preference to go after small fish vs. big fish).  
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Clearly this taxonomy is far from being comprehensive. One 
could suggest that the level of intrinsic motivation is important if one 
is interested in knowing, for example, the distance people would be 
willing to go to recycle; the level of intrinsic motivation may also be 
important in related environmental activities where the cost of 
monitoring is prohibitive. It seems that taking into account the 
differences between legal contexts, while not solving the differences 
in people‘s motivations, we are nevertheless able to apply this 
knowledge to a behaviorally informed regulation rather than to revert 
to the lowest denominator (deterrence in all legal contexts).  
C. Law vs. Money 
The next quandary to be explored in the policy sphere is whether 
the effect of legal intervention on intrinsic motivations is similar to 
its effect on monetary rewards. The answer to this question could 
expand the ability of the policy-maker to better use the arsenal at his 
or her disposal regarding the type of motivations used by people. 
Indeed, in an analysis of crowding-out theories, extrinsic motivations 
can be seen to include a range of intervention types, even deadlines, 
and are definitely not limited to a focus on just monetary rewards.
126
 
In that regard, one prediction from the crowding-out literature may be 
that converting a social practice into a legal requirement may 
inevitably lead to a decrease in the level of intrinsically-related 
motivations. As we have seen, the crowding-out effect is more 
complex than one would assume, so the question arises: In which 
contexts would enacting a law be viewed as having a similar effect as 
imposing a monetary incentive? Or to frame the question differently, 
does imposing a law always carry a similar effect as the provision of 
money with regard to non-instrumental activities? In that context, 
Frey and Stutzer claim that external regulation such as ―command 
and controls‖ is expected to have an effect similar to a monetary 
reward.
127
 Examining the same context from a perspective of various 
commodification processes, Dagan discusses whether the effects of 
 
 126. See Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 2, at 627.  
 127. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 49, at 406.  
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monetary rewards are unique or whether other factors, including 
regulation, could have a similar effect.
128
  
Furthermore, is legal intervention always disruptive when dealing 
with pro-social behaviors in general and love in particular? The 
reason why this question may carry more than one answer is related 
to some of the expressive law theories that were reviewed prior to the 
crowding-out literature in the first part of the Article. According to 
this approach, legal compliance can have multiple motivations and 
law can change behavior due to various mechanisms. Some of these 
mechanisms are not driven by extrinsic motivations but rather boost 
one‘s intrinsic motivation. The law may enhance the functioning of 
voluntary social practices, rather than undermine them. The 
endowment effect supports this view that the law could improve the 
way individuals perceive a practice.
129
 
D. Entitlement and Endowment Effect 
In one of the most influential papers in the field of behavioral 
economics,
130
 Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler have suggested that 
prospect theory
131
 leads to an endowment effect
132
 in which giving up 
things that one owns is especially distressing.
133
 This theory suggests 
that rights legally owned are especially valuable psychologically. 
People should not only be less willing to give up a right once they 
feel it is theirs, they should also be more likely to appreciate it.
134
 In 
other words, enacting a law is likely to make a social practice more 
 
 128  Tsilly Dagan, Commodification Without Money (Bar-Ilan Univ. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 03-10, 2010). 
 129. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1551 (1998). 
 130. See aniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of 
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). 
 131. See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 89.  
 132. See generally Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12879, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12879. 
pdf (describing the endowment effect in the fields of behavorial law and economics). 
 133. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 130, at 1326–28. For a critique of the 
experiments that were shown to create the endowment effect, see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn 
Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory 
and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 passim (2007).  
 134. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 129, at 1551; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1181 (2003). 
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psychologically important and beneficial for those who are entitled to 
receive it under the law.  
Thus, the crowding-out theory may suggest that legal intervention 
undermines a social practice, while the expressive law and 
endowment effect theories suggest that legal intervention may 
improve the functioning of social practices. Based on these two 
conflicting views of the possible effect of legal interventions, in a 
joint work with Tom Tyler, we examined a phenomenon that was 
highly associated with intrinsic motivation—the effect of the law on 
perceived fairness in an organization.
135
 We explored whether the 
influence of ―pay and promotion‖ procedures on employee adherence 
to workplace rules differed depending upon whether those voice 
procedures were enacted within companies voluntarily or because 
they were mandated by law. This question was addressed using both 
a survey of employees and employee reactions to an experimental 
vignette.
136
 The results indicate that the influence of evaluations of 
the procedural justice of performance appraisal hearings on 
judgments of overall workplace fairness, perceptions of management 
legitimacy, and employee rule-abiding behavior is greater when 
employees believe their company‘s workplace procedures are 
mandated by law. Two features of procedures—their prevalence, and 
whether they were expected—led employees to believe they were 
mandated and, consequently, enhanced their influence.
137
 Thus, at 
least in the context of organizational justice, the findings suggest that 
extrinsic intervention may influence the formation of a social practice 
into a legal one, and this is likely to enhance overall levels of rule-
abidance among employees.  
A possible implication of these findings, and one of the main 
quandaries of this Article, is that one cannot make predictions with 
regard to the crowding-out effect of law without taking into account 
the expressive law literature. Combining these two bodies of 
literature suggests that there is a gap between legality and monetary 
 
 135. Yuval Feldman & Tom R. Tyler, Mandated Justice: The Potential Promise and 
Possible Pitfalls of Mandating Procedural Justice in the Workplace (3d Annual Conference on 
Empirical Legal Studies Papers, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133521. 
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incentives, in the context of the dynamics between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. While money may undermine the functioning 
of intrinsic processes as a justice motivation, law could actually 
enhance it.  
E. The Potential Contribution of Legal Uncertainty  
The last policy implication I would like to explore is related to the 
use of uncertainty as a way to reduce the effects of extrinsic 
motivation. In a joint work with Shachar Lifshitz, we focused on the 
contribution of legal uncertainty and the ability of an individual to act 
in a way that would represent his or her genuine preferences, moral 
perception, and true economic interests.
138
 We developed a 
theoretical taxonomy that outlines areas of law where uncertainty is 
most needed.
139
 We argued that in those cases, regulation that would 
clearly and systematically provide legal and economic benefits and 
penalties may lead people to neglect their true preference and behave 
in a manipulative-strategic way.
140
 Our theoretical discussion 
explored the merits of creating a partial veil of ignorance to the ex 
post consequences of the law. We argued that ―such a veil may 
promote values such as autonomy, efficiency, distributive justice, and 
personal well-being. Furthermore, such a veil of ignorance may 
enable people to act in a natural and non-strategic way, namely, in a 
way not driven by legal incentives.‖141  
Such ignorance of the law seems to be at odds with the main 
purpose of legal regimes like criminal and torts law which aim to 
direct people‘s behavior. Our argument seems to run into a logical 
paradox: If following the law may create more harm than good, 
should such a law be abandoned altogether? If the law is just and 
efficient why should we hide it? Recognizing these challenges, we 
developed an innovative taxonomy of three prototypes of legal areas 
where masking the legal consequences of an act, ex ante, would 
benefit both individuals and society. To demonstrate the advantages 
 
 138. Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty (unpublished 
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of legal uncertainty, we conducted an experimental survey, where we 
compared participants' decision making with regard to employing 
salaried workers vs. contractors under a condition of legally related 
monetary advantages. The monetary incentives were provided under 
conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity, and certainty.
142
 In accordance 
with the hypothesis, ―[w]e found that for the measure of self-decision, 
the scenarios of No External Reward and Probabilistic Reward 
generated a significantly higher preference for the salaried employee 
than did the Certain Reward (all p‘s < .05).‖143 We found, however, 
that for the measure of ―what most others would do,‖ the result was 
somewhat different. ―[T]he No External Reward scenario generated a 
significantly higher preference for occupying a salaried employee 
than did the scenarios of Ambiguous Reward, Probabilistic Reward, 
and Certain Reward (all p‘s < .05).‖144  
Thus, the empirical testing demonstrates that certain legal benefits 
have stronger effects on people‘s decisions, but also that both 
probabilistic and ambiguous legal benefits are not stronger than the 
―no legal benefit‖ conditions. While the reduction in the effect of 
ambiguous legal benefits was expected according to the behavioral 
literature, no such effect was expected for the probabilistic legal 
benefits. This effect could possibly be explained by the uniqueness of 
the legal uncertainty, which was shown before to behave differently 
than typical ambiguous information.
145
 Therefore, these findings 
could potentially be seen as supporting the argument that by creating 
a veil between the legal consequences of an act and the ex ante legal 
decision making, we may give one‘s intrinsic consideration an 
opportunity to function without the disruptive effects of the extrinsic 
rewards associated with the ex post legal status of the act.  
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We have seen that people are influenced by a multitude of 
motivations, through various routes and dynamics. Even within the 
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bodies of literature that we have reviewed—the expressive law on 
one hand and the crowding-out on the other—the direction of the 
influence of extrinsic motivation on intrinsic is far from being clear 
and is sometimes contradictory. The complexity of the prediction is 
exacerbated when taking into account the gap between what people 
believe motivates them vs. what they believe motivates others.  
Based on these three bodies of literature and the numerous 
moderators that would affect their predictions, we have suggested a 
few policy-oriented approaches. First, focus on framing by asking 
how we define the legal reward and how defining the legal payments 
by calling them fines, taxes, deposits, or rewards is shown to have 
meaningful influences in various contexts. In addition, adding verbal 
rewards and various expressive law components to impose a duty 
could supplement the use of framing in balancing intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. Second, targeted regulation, with sensitivity to 
the heterogeneity in levels of intrinsic motivation, could be used to 
treat different people with different types of rewards. We have seen 
some findings that demonstrate the differences in the effect of 
incentives on individuals with high and low levels of intrinsic 
motivations. Finally, it was shown that strategic ambiguity of the law 
could undermine some of the disruptive effects of the law, in areas 
where maintaining the dominance of intrinsic motivation is most 
important.  
Nevertheless, what we view as the main point, both theoretically 
and practically, is the fact that there is no one-size-fits-all solution as 
to how policy-makers should think about the intrinsic vs. extrinsic 
dynamic. It is hard to predict the accumulated effect of these 
mechanisms without taking into account the notion of context, and 
the predictions will always be limited. It seems that the main 
theoretical effort should be focused on creating some multiple 
dimension taxonomy of contexts, where the dynamics of intrinsic-
extrinsic motivations could be revisited.  
A few tentative thoughts about such taxonomies were inserted as 
part of the discussion throughout this Article, but some of the main 
concepts deserve special attention. Thus far, we have presented data 
with regard to three main types of activities: recycling, whistle–
blowing, and divulgence of trade secrets. These three examples will 
be used to help us think about the importance of being aware of legal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/3
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contexts when the policy-maker attempts to decide how to incentivize 
behaviors without harming individuals‘ intrinsic motivations.  
A. What is the Nature of the Behavior? 
We have discussed the importance of taking into account the 
behavior the policy-maker wishes to promote. The quality of the 
behavior dimension makes the intrinsic motivation a more important 
factor. In that regard, one cannot excel in recycling or even in organ 
donation.
146
 In some legal contexts, we care only about one‘s activity 
level and willingness to pay. In others, the quality of the behavior is 
more important. As in whistle-blowing or even blood donation, it is 
less desirable to think about employees who do it purely for extrinsic 
reasons. Furthermore, in legal contexts, where ―extra-role‖ activity is 
desired, the cost of harming intrinsic motivation increases and one 
should be more cautious in introducing extrinsic motives.  
B. From What Proportion of the Target Population Do We Need 
Cooperation?
147
 
Another dimension with high importance is consideration of how 
much cooperation of the target population we need when the level of 
intrinsic motivation is heterogeneous. Here, we can use the three 
contexts suggested above. In the context of trade secrets, we need the 
cooperation of 100 percent of the target population, from those with 
the highest level of intrinsic motivation to those with the lowest level 
of intrinsic motivation. Therefore, the price of harming the intrinsic 
motivation of committed employees may be secondary to making 
sure that even those without intrinsic motivation will be loyal to their 
employers. The context of whistle-blowing is the exact opposite, 
where we only need the cooperation of some of the employees which 
will go forward when some illegal activity occurs within the 
organization. So we mainly care about those who are high on intrinsic 
motivation with the policy-makers focused on that population. For 
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various reasons, we may not even want to incentivize those without 
intrinsic motivation.
148
 Finally, in the context of recycling, we are 
interested in averaging, or creating a situation where as many people 
as possible will recycle. In such a situation, we have no preference 
for either high or low intrinsically-motivated individuals and, 
therefore, the balancing consideration made by the policy-maker is 
whether or not to use extrinsic motivation and through which types of 
incentives.  
C. How Important Is It that You Think that Others Are Being 
Motivated by Intrinsic Motivations? 
We have discussed at great length the fact that people are biased 
in their perceptions of what others are doing and for which reasons. It 
is clear, however, that the effect of why people do what they do is 
different depending on the context, based on the nature of the 
relationship, the level of reciprocity, the importance of others‘ 
motivation to one‘s evaluation of its authenticity, and more. 
Presumably, the closer the behavior is to areas where one would 
expect identity-related factors to be dominant, the greater the damage 
is to the other from viewing one's motivation as being extrinsically 
motivated. In more commercial contexts, it is less likely that we 
would see extrinsic motivation as harming the authenticity in others' 
behavior.  
D. How Measurable is the Behavior?  
Finally, a relatively straightforward aspect one might want to 
consider is the visibility of the behavior and the ability to measure 
both its quantity and quality (recycling in houses vs. loyalty to 
employer in keeping proprietary information secret). It is safe to 
assume that with more visible and measureable behavior, the policy-
maker should care less about harming intrinsic motivation, the main 
advantage of which is its limited dependency on external 
measurement. Thinking about these context dimensions could lead 
 
 148  For example, if we provide a monetary incentive for whistle-blowing, we may fear 
false reports by bounty hunters. 
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the policy-maker to focus efforts on protecting intrinsic motivation in 
the most suitable contexts.  
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